Testimony of Jeff Drumtra on Hunger and Humanitarian Issues in Rwanda before the House Agriculture Committee Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger by US Embassy Rwanda
Masthead Logo Digital Commons @ George Fox University
David Rawson Collection on the Rwandan
Genocide Archives and Museum
6-10-1993
Testimony of Jeff Drumtra on Hunger and
Humanitarian Issues in Rwanda before the House
Agriculture Committee Subcommittee on Foreign
Agriculture and Hunger
US Embassy Rwanda
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/rawson_rwanda
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Archives and Museum at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted
for inclusion in David Rawson Collection on the Rwandan Genocide by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University.
For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.
Recommended Citation
US Embassy Rwanda, "Testimony of Jeff Drumtra on Hunger and Humanitarian Issues in Rwanda before the House Agriculture




1025 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 920 
Washington, DC 20005 
Tel: (202) 347-3507 Fax: (202) 347-3418 
Informing the public since 1958 
Testimony of Jeff Drumtra, Policy Analyst 
U.S. Committee for Refugees 
on 
Hunger and Humanitarian Issues in Rwanda 
before the 
House Agriculture Committee 
Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger 
June 10, 1993 
USCR is a program of the American Council for Nationalities Service 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, I would like to thank you 
and your Subcommittee colleagues for holding these two days of hearings on international hunger 
issues, and for devoting this morning's panel to an examination of hunger and other emergency 
humanitarian needs facing internally displaced persons in the central African country of Rwanda. 
I am JeffDrumtra, Africa policy analyst for the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR). 
USCR is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that regularly monitors and assesses the 
situations of refugees and internally displaced people around the world. As you might expect, 
hunger is usually a deadly companion of displaced populations. I have recently returned from 
Rwanda, where some 900,000 Rwandese who fled their homes before and during February now 
live in temporary, squalid camps that are shon on food and other necessities of life. I appreciate 
your invitation to testify on this emergency today, which is one of the most underreponed 
humanitarian crises on a continent filled with underreponed emergencies. 
As my testimony will discuss below, an effective humanitarian response to Rwanda by the 
U.S. should help Rwandese to: 
• overcome transportation and logistical difficulties hampering food relief distributions; 
• distribute critical non-food assistance such as plastic sheeting, blankets, and health care; 
• station larger numbers of neutral military observers in Rwanda's demilitarized zone; and 
• reach a political settlement to Rwanda's underlying conflict 
Before I delve more deeply into Rwanda, Mr. Chairman, I would first like to thank you for 
recently enlarging the scope of your Subcommittee to address international hunger issues. Your 
Subcommittee's expanded oversight can help partially to fill the large gap left by the unfortunate 
termination of the House Select Committee on Hunger earlier this year. 
You have indicated, Mr. Chairman, that your Subcommittee's two days of hearings will 
serve at least two purposes: to examine general mechanisms that can enable U.S. and UN 
humanitarian assistance agencies to respond more quickly and effectively to emergencies 
worldwide; and to help Congress better understand the humanitarian conditions and needs that 
currently exist in specific countries such as Rwanda. Therefore, I will try to address both levels of 
concern. My testimony begins with a brief review of the political and historical roots of this latest 
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humanitarian crisis in Rwanda Surely one of the recurring themes in your two-day hearing is that 
emergency food shortages are often the result of politics rather than acts of Mother Nature. This is 
the case in Rwanda Secondly, I will describe the current humanitarian needs in Rwanda based on 
my site visit there last month. Thirdly, I will offer several concrete policy recommendations for 
your consideration. Finally, my testimony points to some general lessons from the Rwanda 
emergency that the Subcommittee can apply to other humanitarian crises around the world. 
II. BACKGROUND OF RWANDA'S CURRENT HUMANITARIAN 
EMERGENCY 
Pre-1990 Roots of Ethnic Conflict 
Today's humanitarian emergency in Rwanda is rooted in the country's history. Rwanda's 
estimated 7.6 million people are divided into two principal ethnic groups: about 87 percent of 
R wandese are ethnic-Hutu; most of the remaining 13 percent are ethnic-Tutsi. These two ethnic 
groups have endured a sordid history of mutual slaughter since independence in 1962. 
This ethnic animosity is largely the legacy of Belgian colonialists and, later, Rwandan 
demagogues, who have used divide-and-rule tactics to retain their own power and privilege. 
Belgian colonialists, for example, allowed only Tutsis to attend school until the late 1940s, 
installed Tutsi chiefs over Hutu regions, and pressed Hutu men into forced labor gangs under Tutsi 
overseers who were themselves often forced to work against their will. 
Prior to independence, therefore, the Tutsi were politically dominant despite their minority 
status. In the pre-independence turmoil of 1959-62, representatives of the majority Hutu took 
control from the Tutsi. More than 20,000 Tutsi were butchered in the power struggle, and several 
thousand persons fled to surrounding countries, where they became--and remain--refugees. By 
some estimates, 40-70 percent of R wandese Tutsis fled their country during 1959-64. 
Deadly ethnic upheaval has continued sporadically inside and around Rwanda into the 
1990s, in large part because the government did not lead all Rwandans toward a way of living 
together that would have enabled a half-million Rwandese refugees who are outside the country to 
return home. 
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1990 Invasion by Exiles 
The half-million Rwandese exiles forced to live outside their country were largely forgotten 
by the outside world until they forced their way into the world's consciousness by forcibly re-
entering Rwanda in October 1990. An armed force of Rwandese exiles composed mostly--but not 
exclusively--ofTutsi invaded Rwanda from neighboring Uganda on October 1, 1990. A vicious 
civil war ensued which initially uprooted some 300,000 persons and left the rebels in control of 
much of northern Rwanda. President Juvenal Habyarimana and his ruling party, which is largely 
composed of select northern Hutu clans, have survived militarily only because of substantial 
French military assistance. The invading exiles and the government declared a cease fire in July 
1992. 
The 1990 invasion triggered important social reforms. The country's apartheid-like identity 
card system was eliminated, and the ruling party was pushed closer to multiparty democracy. 
Human rights abuses continued, however, including large-scale massacres of Tutsi civilians by the 
President's supporters. In January 1993, a distinguished international team of human rights 
experts announced its findings that soldiers and agents of the Rwandan government have 
conducted systematic murder, rape, and other violations against civilians, mostly against ethnic 
Tutsis. Human rights investigators also discovered widespread evidence of genocide and other 
war crimes. The human rights team concluded that the perpetrators "were following superiors' 
orders" and that "the failure and/or refusal of the authorities, at the highest levels, to investigate all 
these massacres and punish those responsible indicates complicity in this." The human rights 
investigators criticized government and rebel forces and concluded that "a climate of terror 
pervades Rwandan life." 
Despite these atrocities against civilians, the July 1992 cease fire between government and 
rebel annies remained in effect, and multiparty talks on power sharing reached a tentative accord in 
January 1993. The power sharing agreement raised expectations that multiparty elections were 
imminent. The European Community hailed the political pact as a "dynamic quest...for a peaceful 
and lasting solution to the conflict." 
1993 Resumption of War 
The January 1993 power-sharing accord appeared to bring all Rwandans tantalizingly close 
to peace after decades of bloodletting. Within days of the accord, however, cause for optimism 
vanished. Violence erupted. Terrified Rwandese fled their homes. This rapid chain of events led 
to the current humanitarian emergency in Rwanda which, thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, is 
receiving much-needed attention at today's hearing. 
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The violence erupted in late January when youthful supporters of Rwanda's ruling party, 
the National Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), went on a rampage clearly 
intended to scuttle the peace agreement that had been reached days earlier. President Habyarimana 
and his hardline supporters protested that the accord negotiated by duly appointed officials did not 
adequately protect the MRND's hold on power. President Habyarimana fired the negotiator who 
had been a chief architect of the peace plan. Party zealots, fueled by the President's action, 
initiated violence in Kigali, the capital city, which then spread to the countryside. Rwanda's 
President, in effect, invited a relapse into bloody chaos. 
Hundreds of Tutsi civilians were then murdered. Houses were systematically destroyed. 
In reaction, the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), which had agreed to the negotiated accord, 
but whose record is also blemished, scrapped the cease fire and attacked on February 8, advancing 
within a few miles of the capital, Kigali. Some 600,000 Rwandese fled the renewed fighting, 
adding to the 300,000 persons who had fled warfare in previous years. The massive population 
displacement left empty the most fertile farm land in an overcrowded country which struggles to 
feed itself even in normal times. 
A new cease fire took effect on March 9, and the RPF agreed to withdraw its troops to 
positions held before the February 8 attack, thereby creating a demilitarized but highly dangerous 
buffer zone some 20 miles wide and approximately 40 miles long between the two armies. Today, 
an estimated 600,000 Rwandese remain internally displaced at some 30 camps south of the buffer 
zone, while another 300,000 or more have returned to live in the dangerous no-man's land 
between the two armies. 
III. RWANDA'S HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY & ASSISTANCE NEEDS 
The U.S. Committee for Refugees and a handful of other agencies and officials have 
closely monitored humanitarian conditions in Rwanda affecting the 900,000 Rwandese who have 
fled their homes in the past 30 months. In early February this year, USCR notified newspapers 
across the U.S. that Rwanda was undergoing a crisis that "almost no one is watching adequately." 
On February 18, U.S. officials in Rwanda cabled their superiors in Washington that "a disaster 
exists" in Rwanda and warned that "the food situation is grim." On February 23, U.S. officials 
cabled a warning about "a catastrophe in the making" and noted that "more displaced are arriving 
every hour." On Apri113, the ICRC announced that "900,000 displaced people in Rwanda face a 
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major humanitarian catastrophe." Throughout March and April, we at USCR continued our efforts 
to bring Rwanda's emergency to the attention of the American press, which has nonetheless 
remained willfully oblivious to the Rwandan crisis. In May, as the misery of Rwanda's internally 
uprooted people entered its fourth month, I went to Rwanda to assess the conditions of the war-
displaced people first-hand. 
Needing the Basics of Life -· Food, Shelter, Clothing 
Remember that Rwanda is small, extremely mountainous, and ranks as the most densely 
populated country in Africa. This means that the 900,000 people who were forced to flee their 
homes had almost nowhere to go. I saw the desperation that has led them to construct crowded, 
makeshift camps that cling precariously to the steep slopes of denuded hills north of the capital, 
Kigali. This is the rainy season, and I fear that mud slides could easily sweep the huts--and the 
families within them--down the steep hillsides. 
Mr. Chairman, the most basic requirements of human life are food, shelter, and clothing--
none of which exists in adequate supply for Rwanda's uprooted people. Many of them told me 
they fled their homes wearing only the clothes on their back in the frantic nighttime hours of 
February 8 when the war suddenly erupted anew. The small huts used for shelter provide scant 
protection from Rwanda's rainy season and the chilly night air in the mountains. Two of the most 
. urgent--and simple--needs are plastic sheeting so that families can protect their huts from the rain, 
and more blankets for warmth against the cold. I saw that much of the plastic sheeting donated by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which local relief officials distributed in 
February, is beginning to tear and wear out, and entire families are trying to stay warm by sharing 
a single small blanket. In addition, these hastily constructed camps lack sanitation systems, water 
wells, regular health care, or education systems. 
Food distributions in the camps are irregular, and some Rwandese families in the camps 
must make their 10-day food rations stretch for 20-25 days. The result, according to Red Cross 
field workers with whom I spoke, is that some persons receive less than 1,000 calories per day--
half the minimum caloric intake humans require. Malnutrition is climbing and affects about 
100,000 displaced Rwandese, according to a recent study. Red Cross doctors told me that 
dysentery, malaria, and other infectious illnesses associated with malnutrition and weakened 
immune systems are on the rise. One series of camps near Kigali, where food distributions are 
somewhat more frequent, nonetheless suffers 28 deaths per week among its population of 25,000, 
according to the Red Cross. 
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Rwandese families are going hungry even though, by all accounts, international donors 
have contributed enough relief food to meet the immediate need of 12,000 tons per month. The 
problem is transportation. Rwanda is a landlocked country and must rely on shipments by air or 
by truck. When I visited Rwanda in early May, three daily airlifts of food had been reduced to one 
plane per day due to a shortage of aviation fuel. Relief workers told me they have encountered a 
shortage of large trucks as they try to ship 20 truck loads of food per day into Rwanda, and road 
closures have blocked food deliveries from Uganda. 
Delivering relief assistance to needy Rwandese is further complicated by the fact that as 
many as 300,000 R wandese have begun leaving the camps and are returning to their war-damaged 
homes in the still-dangerous demilitarized zone, where food is scarce and general insecurity has 
hampered relief efforts. I visited this buffer zone and found a total absence of medicines and basic 
services. On March 12, the UN Security Council had passed Resolution #812 urging the RPF 
rebels and the government forces to grant safe passage for relief supplies and Rwandese wanting to 
return home to the demilitarized zone. On March 17, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) asked the two sides to hasten negotiations so that displaced persons could go home. On 
May 5, NGOs operating in Rwanda, including Oxfam, Caritas, the Belgian Red Cross, and 
Medecins Sans Frontieres, publicly urged the Rwandan president and the RPF to reach a security 
agreement "without the least delay" so that NGOs could begin providing desperately needed 
humanitarian assistance in the dangerous buffer zone. 
Finally, on May 30--less than two weeks ago--the government and the RPF signed an 
agreement allowing resettlement and humanitarian aid in the demilitarized zone. It remains too 
early, however, to assess the effectiveness of this agreement The May 30 accord further states 
that neutral unarmed international military observers will provide security in the demilitarized zone 
and pledges both armies to identify land mines they have left behind in the war area. 
Now Is The Pivotal -- But Expensive -- Moment 
Humanitarian conditions in Rwanda have reached a pivotal moment As the crisis drags 
into its fifth month, medical workers told me that health conditions will deteriorate at an accelerated 
pace if food distribution remains sporadic at the camps and large numbers of war-affected 
Rwandese in the buffer zone remain inaccessible to relief workers. On the other hand, relative 
normalcy could return within six months if all displaced families are able to return home safely and 
receive reliable deliveries of food and medicine until the next harvest in December. Rich soil in the 
war-affected region offers two and sometimes three growing seasons annually. 
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Rwanda need not be a long-term humanitarian emergency if the appropriate political and 
assistance steps occur now and over the next six months. Perhaps the requisite political steps are 
beyond the influence of this Subcommittee, but the humanitarian assistance steps are not. United 
Nations agencies have issued a consolidated appeal of $78.5 million to donors for April-December 
1993. The UN appeal includes $38 million for food relief and food production, $15 million to 
resolve the logistical problems described above, nearly $15 million for health and special nutrition 
programs, and $3 million for water, sanitation, and other needs. UN agencies are also wisely 
seeking $5 million for conservation programs to counteract the alarming deforestation that occurred 
as 900,000 displaced persons desperately chopped trees to make room for their huts and to find 
wood for cooking and warmth. I saw recent deforestation and soil erosion that will last for 
decades, affecting the livelihoods of local residents long after all 900,000 internally displaced 
persons have finally returned home. 
The Belgian Red Cross is devoting some $4.8 million to Rwanda in the first six months of 
this year to distribute sorely needed non-food items such as blankets and plastic sheeting. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross has launched an emergency appeal of $88 million--nearly 
one-third of the agency's entire Africa budget--for food and medical aid, sanitation programs, and 
tracing of separated Rwandese families. ICRC's appeal remains $22 million unfunded, however. 
Other organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, Africare, CARE, Oxfam/U .K., and 
Medecines Sans Frontieries/Belgium are also operative in Rwanda and will attempt to expand their 
programs. 
I am pleased to learn that USAID plans virtually to double its commitment to Rwanda due 
to the emergency. USAID's 1993 budget will be approximately $40 million, most of which will 
go to emergency relief. 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1 • Provide funds to improve local transportation/distribution of food relief. 
Even if all displaced Rwandese are able to return home in the near future, food relief will remain 
necessary for at least six months. Although international donors have supplied food, sufficient 
amounts fail to reach beneficiaries in Rwanda due to transportation difficulties. Expensive airlifts 
of food from neighboring countries may remain necessary on a limited basis. Most food can reach 
beneficiaries by less expensive truck transport if adequate funding is available for road repair and 
fleet maintenance. Funds for improved monitoring of food distributions can reduce food 
assistance needs by 20 percent. 
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2 • Provide funds for critical non-food assistance such as plastic sheeting, 
blankets, and health services. 
Shelter is a critical problem in the camps for displaced Rwandese. Even if all displaced Rwandese 
are able to return home in the near future, adequate shelter will remain problematic as Rwandese 
rebuild their permanent houses that were destroyed by war and pillagers. A simple investment in 
more blankets will reduce health problems later. It is unacceptable that five or more persons are 
forced to share a single blanket in Rwanda's chilly night climate. All reports agree that the health 
status of displaced Rwandese is deteriorating. Even if all displaced Rwandese are able to return 
home in the near future, they will find local health clinics stripped bare. 
3 • Provide diplomatic assistance to the neutral international military observers 
who must police the dangerous demilitarized zone to which displaced persons are 
trying to return. 
Most displaced Rwandese cannot--and should not--return home until it is safe to do so. At last 
report, fewer than 50 neutral military observers, sponsored by the Organization of African Unity, 
were in Rwanda They are too few to provide the security necessary in the demilitarized zone. 
Their expanded presence is essential to bolster the tentative agreement governing the demilitarized 
zone. 
4 • Supply strong diplomatic support to the overall peace process under 
negotiation between the Rwanda government and the RPF. 
I realize this recommendation stretches the purview of this Subcommittee, but ultimately the 
humanitarian emergency in Rwanda is rooted in political problems. The U.S. should rally behind 
Rwanda's ongoing peace process in an unbiased fashion. The peace process is more likely to 
reach a final resolution if the U.S. provides a much-needed counterweight to the blatantly pro-
government position of French diplomats and the French military. The goal must not be for one 
side to win, but for an accommodation that yields a democratic system that responds to the 
legitimate needs of all Rwandans. 
V. LESSONS FROM RWANDA'S HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY 
Mr. Chairman, you have indicated that one of the purposes of these two days of hearings--
beyond exploring the dire needs of Rwanda--is to examine mechanisms that can enable U.S. and 
UN humanitarian assistance agencies to respond more quickly and effectively to emergencies 
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worldwide. Surely many of the operational relief agencies testifying at this hearing can offer you 
excellent, specific recommendations that would improve their operational abilities in the field. 
Although the U.S. Committee for Refugees does not operate relief programs in the field, 
USCR regularly makes assessment visits to emergencies around the world. Our experience has 
caused us to note repeatedly that effective humanitarian response requires at least five components: 
early warnings from the field about the emergency {which we at USCR attempt to provide); 
rapid response and sustained response from donors and relief organizations; close 
coordination among relief organizations in the field and at headquarters; and political 
resolution of the underlying conflict that caused the humanitarian crisis. 
Early Warning 
One absolutely essential mechanism is that relief workers and other officials in the field 
must supply quick, early warnings of an unfolding emergency to their headquarters in 
Washington, New York, or Geneva. Reports from the field must credibly assess humanitarian 
needs and must not shy away from prescriptions for bold action, where appropriate. As I detailed 
in Part III, the record cleary demonstrates that NGOs and U.S. officials in the field in Rwanda 
provided ample warning of the emergency to any donors and others who were willing to listen. 
Rapid Response 
Several nongovernmental relief organizations {NGOs) in Rwanda complain that slow 
responses from international donors have hindered the ability of NGOs to respond rapidly to the 
emergency needs of Rwanda's internally displaced population. It seems clear to me that a shortage 
of such basics as blankets and plastic sheeting five months into the emergency is unacceptable. We 
at USCR see this systemic problem repeated around the world. The UN system--and the nations 
that fund it--must devise a better staffed and better fmanced emergency response capability. NGOs 
must have immediate access to a larger pool of emergency funds so that time-consuming 
fundraising appeals do not slow their operations. 
Sustained Response 
Whether the world will mount the sustained response required to alleviate Rwanda's crisis 
remains to be seen. UN agencies and NGOs in Rwanda have explained the financial needs of their 
emergency response programs in Rwanda through December, but it is too early to know if their 
appeals will receive funding. 
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Close Coordination 
The international community must devise a stronger international mechanism to decide 
which relief agencies are best equipped to respond to an emergency in a given comer of the world. 
Currently the international relief community addresses humanitarian emergencies in an ad hoc 
manner, and precious response time is lost. The UN formed its Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs (DHA) last year to improve coordination within the UN, and DHA has issued a 
consolidated funding appeal for Rwanda on behalf of other UN agencies, but DHA must cultivate 
closer links with NGOs in order to coordinate effectively during humanitarian emergencies. In 
Rwanda, NGO workers told me that they lack adequate coordination with the Rwanda 
government, p~arily due to some government officials' unresponsiveness at crucial moments in 
the crisis. 
Political Resolution 
These emergencies are political as well as humanitarian. Rather than wait for conflict to 
erupt before we respond, the world community, led by the U.S., should engage in preventive 
diplomacy which could nip political disputes in the bud before they produce humanitarian 
tragedies. The UN Security Council, for example, should operate a permanent mediation office. 
If conflict erupts nonetheless, the UN should ensure that aggressive diplomatic efforts accompany--
and complement--relief programs. In Rwanda, for example, final peace can occur only when 
repatriation occurs for refugees cUirently forced to live outside the country. The slow peace 
process in Rwanda would, I am convinced, respond favorably to international diplomatic pressure. 
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify. 
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